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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurial investors, outsiders or entrepreneurs themselves, seek their re-
ward in the form of funds freed up from their existing businesses and to transfer
them to promising new ventures. That is why they call for lower corporate,
dividend and capital gains taxes. Governments are not necessarily interested
in lower taxes on income from capital, but highly interested in the likely ef-
fects on investment activity and new firm formation resulting from changes in
tax policies. Applied tax theory on the cost of capital for investments centres
on the issue of whether double taxation of dividends matters for marginal in-
vestments (the old view) or whether it is that of retained earnings (the new or
trapped equity view), the dividend tax falling upon inframarginal investments.1
It therefore distances itself from the pertinent entrepreneurial issues. In par-
ticular, mainstream analysis has largely eluded questions as to what extent
corporation tax, dividend tax and capital gains tax have separate roles during
the life-cycle of entrepreneurial ventures.
Entrepreneurs adopt the role of risk-taking by establishing and running their
own enterprises, providing eﬀort and private money to undertake investment de-
cisions. Thus, it is important to understand in what way taxes aﬀect enterprise
formation, the quality of entrepreneurs and their eﬀort. Do taxes erect an entry
barrier? How do they interact with the investment choices of start-up entrepre-
neurs facing failure risk? In what way do taxes influence those enterprises which
survive to the expansion stage? Unfortunately, most existing tax analysis has
dealt with publicly traded mature companies and is therefore inadequate as it
lacks the relevant links to the intrinsic characteristics of a start-up enterprise.
The area of taxation and enterprise formation has not, however, been com-
pletely neglected. Kanbur (1979), one of the first to introduce a model of entre-
preneurship and occupational choice, argued that progressive taxation tends to
increase market entry of entrepreneurs if risk aversion is high. One can, how-
ever, challenge the view behind this result, i.e. that progressive taxation could
provide a form of insurance for risky activity at the start-up stage. One should,
however, note that entrepreneurs working on a single project cannot benefit
from loss oﬀset provisions to the same extent as companies with several uncor-
related projects. In his analysis of the birth and death of firms, King (1989)
assumes that the implementation of an innovation, a business idea, requires a
corporate form and either the sale of equity to the outside suppliers of finance
or the sale of the business idea to an existing mature company. The corporate
form entails an additional tax beyond the sole proprietor. But then the tax is
capitalized in the market price of the equity, which is trapped in the corporate
form. Dealing with a mature company results in an implicit tax caused by the
cost of bureaucracy. The larger the additional tax on companies, the smaller
the proportion of business ideas that lead to the formation of new companies.
For a given corporate tax structure, a joint distribution of bureaucracy costs
1The two views are summarized by Auerbach (1983). The "new view" was developed by
King (1974, 1977), Bergstöm and Södersten (1977), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981).
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and the profitability of new ideas defines the birth rate of new companies in
King (1989).
Sinn (1991a,b) provides an important balancing contribution to the old and
new views, describing a dividend tax induced evolution of a firm. The firm
is set up with external equity, but because there is a dividend tax the firm
underinvests in respect of its long-run stock of capital, thus corroborating the
old view. Thereafter, the firm enters a purely internally financed growth phase,
during which no dividends are paid and no new shares are issued. Having
reached its long-run optimal stock of capital, the new view applies. The firm
distributes all its profits unless new profitable investment opportunities emerge.
Dietz (2003) extends the Sinn framework in a general equilibrium framework.
Some studies have addressed the optimal taxation of enterprises under asym-
metric information (Moresi (1998)). Such papers show that market entry and
entrepreneurial eﬀorts are important mechanisms which are absent from com-
pany tax models, which focus on the share price under taxation. Gordon (1998)
has argued that entrepreneurs have access to methods of transforming labor in-
come to capital income.2 Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001) have explored the
implications of diﬀerential insurance on labor and business risks. Keuschnigg
and Nielsen (2003, 2004) have studied tax eﬀects on venture capital-backed
firms.
The economics of unincorporated enterprises and closely held corporations
with a dominant owner has received less attention than analyses of publicly
traded mature companies. Yet there are fundamental diﬀerences between an
unincorporated enterprise and a mature company. They operate in diﬀerent
stages of the life-cycle of a firm. One approach is to think of an owner-managed
enterprise as a premature prototype of a mature company, though it may never
develop to that stage. Indeed, empirical figures indicate that about half of
new start-ups default or vanish within the first five years of their life-cycle
(Geroski (1995), EUROSTAT (1996)). This means also that the economics of an
owner-managed enterprise is diﬀerent from that of a mature corporation with
diversified share ownership and a management team working on an incentive
scheme. Limited ability to bear and share risks also restricts access to markets
for individuals who face substantial uncertainty in the early stage of the project.3
This is diﬀerent from an enterprise in the mature stage, having a proven track
record on success and being able to rely on outside capital markets to finance
its expansion investment and managing risks by diversified ownership. Coelho,
De Meza and Reyniers (2004) have, however, argued that entrepreneurs may be
subject to unrealistic optimism.
The current paper develops a framework for an enterprise run by an owner-
2We argue below that untaxed private benefits also create a source of tax-free income for
entrepreneurs, compensating somewhat the unobservability of the eﬀort cost.
3When the project is fully financed from outside sources in conditions of asymmetric in-
formation, the problem is a diﬀerent one. Low-quality projects are subsidized by high-quality
projects (de Meza and Webb (1999)). As the entrepreneurs do not have a reputation or out-
side assets to be pledged as collateral, outside financiers face a lemon’s problem, distorting
the early cost of capital.
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manager. The life-cycle of an enterprise is assumed to have both a start-up
phase and an expansion phase with diﬀerent technologies arising from a learning
eﬀect. Unsuccessful ideas are wiped out. Only successful ideas can lead to
an expansion stage, allowing the entrepreneur to cash profit, say, via an IPO.
While earlier studies on tax eﬀects mostly worked with models which abstract
from business risks, we introduce entrepreneurial risk. However, the well-known
Domar-Musgrave argument does not apply in the current context, because the
government does not share losses from the start-up phase and no insurance is
available for the genuine business risk for moral hazard reasons.
Our major results are: for an incorporated enterprise (i) the entrepreneur’s
ability threshold rises with the tax rate of a uniform rate structure, (ii) the start-
up investment is not aﬀected by undervaluation, but the discouragement engen-
dered by dividend taxation is compensated by realization-based capital gains
tax, (iii) with undervaluation, the expansion-stage cost of capital corresponds
to the Johansson-Samuelson tax, which is lower than the new view suggests,
(iv) without undervaluation, the dividend tax provides a boost to investment
in the expansion stage. Moreover, whenever the dividend tax is lower than the
(discounted) capital gains tax, the corporate tax system does not distort the
incorporation of enterprises in the Harberger sense.
Section 2 presents the ingredients of the model without taxation, focusing
on the career choice of individuals between risky entrepreneurship and a secured
outside option. Section 3 introduces the classical taxation of corporations un-
der the key assumption of the new view and explores whether the tax system
creates an entry barrier in general and whether corporation tax works against
the incorporation of companies. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model of an entrepreneur
Motivation. Before being able to analyze fruitfully the taxation of an en-
terprise, it is necessary to have an appropriate model of an enterprise without
taxation. There are reasons why the analysis of an entrepreneur cannot be
properly carried out in a model of an incorporated company. First, we need to
consider a firm where the owner operates as an active manager.4 Second, an
entrepreneurial project typically requires consecutive decisions, including the
initial "sweat" eﬀort in planning and financial injection, followed by the sub-
sequent setting-up of the ultimate production and marketing facilities.5 Third,
the risk profile has an intertemporal dimension in that uncertainty is greatest at
the early stages (Hall (2002)). After the initial stage, the entrepreneur obtains
a signal of the project’s success. As in risky projects, the subsequent decisions
4The owner may have sold, say, a minority of shares to investors but typically the shares
are not listed on the main list of stock exchange.
5A discrete formulation appears to be somewhat more illuminating than a continuous one.
Moreover, introducing uncertainty and information revelation changes the expansion analysis
and allows for dividend determination within the growth phase, absent from a determistic
case, cf. Sinn (1991a).
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are conditional on success in the earlier stages; the validity of a determinis-
tic framework is limited to risk-free-projects. Following from the intertemporal
risk profile, projects which are able to attract outside finance face a lemon’s pre-
mium or discount on their early cost of finance. These arise from informational
asymmetry and distort market entry and project quality due to the implied
cross-subsidization identified by DeMeza and Webb (1999). Such a distortion is
absent if entrepreneurs have access to equity of their own, the case studied by
our paper. Fourth, a substantial proportion of enterprises fail in the initial state.
A successful enterprise, having passed the initial stage, can choose between how
much to distribute in dividends and how much to invest in expansion. Fifth,
though the initial eﬀort required from the entrepreneur may be compensated by
private benefits arising in the later stages of a successful project, it represents a
sunk cost and cannot be recouped in the case of a failure. For these reasons, a
model of an enterprise with a start-up phase cannot be copied from the theory
of a mature corporation.
Ability distribution Potential entrepreneurs possess a project idea. There
is a continuum of entrepreneurs, indexed by ability a ∈ (0, a). This ability is re-
flected in an agent-specific skill. Some are more productive and innovative than
others. They all are risk-neutral. They face a career choice between forming
an enterprise and entering the labor market. Commitment to entrepreneurship
requires an initial eﬀort, e > 0, and an initial investment, k > 0, at time t = 0.
Eﬀort represents a non-replicable input, like sweat capital.6 The eﬀort cost is
convex, c(e) = 12e
2.
The value of an entrepreneurial career The allocation of individuals to
risky industries occurs by self-selection. An investment k in a risky project
provides access to a risky return. With a probability of π > 0, the project will
be a success. If it succeeds, the entrepreneur gets returns of k+ af(e, k) > k.
With a probability of 1−π, the project will fail and yield a zero return. The risk
aﬀects the career choice and the start-up investment. It is assumed that f(e, k)
is jointly concave in e and k. There are three stages: t = 0, 1, 2. At stage t = 0,
individuals make their career choice. Those choosing entrepreneurship provide
an eﬀort, e, to work with their business idea and make the initial investment,
k. The first stage provides the entrepreneurs with a signal of the profitability
of their idea. Only enterprises with a positive signal can expand; those with a
negative signal leave the market. Those with a positive signal have the option
to allocate the first-stage cash flow as an immediate dividend, d, or to expansion
investment, K > 0. To highlight the idea that risks are greatest at the early
stage of a project, we assume that the second-stage return is not subject to
uncertainty.
Thus, to emphasize the fundamental diﬀerences between start-up enterprises
and mature companies in terms of the ability and eﬀort needed and the risk in-
volved, we introduce diﬀerent technologies, af(e, k), F (K), with access to the
6 In this respect, our model oﬀers a wider view of firm birth than, say, King (1989).
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second obtainable stochastically. Intuitively, as the start-up technology is a pro-
totype of the mature company, the diﬀerence arises from learning and business
experience as first discussed by Arrow (1962), yet from a somewhat diﬀerent
angle. To survive successfully into an expansion stage, it is also necessary for
the entrepreneur to develop a proper organizational set-up for his business, a
well functioning entrepreneurial or corporate culture.
The second-stage technology can be viewed as an advanced version of the
first-stage technology and formally expressed as F (a, x) = af(0, x). It does not
require specialized inputs. Hence, no eﬀort is needed and the return is given by
F (a,K) which is increasing and strictly concave in a and K. To economize in
notation, we work with F (K) in the following, surpressing a.
If the entrepreneur is successful in the first stage (of the enterprise life-cycle),
in the second stage he also has access to private benefits, bK, assumed to be
related to the amount invested in the second stage, b > 0.7 Note, however,
that private benefits in later stages do not represent a free lunch for surviving
entrepreneurs who had to undertake costly eﬀorts in the early stages.
We assume that there is full depreciation of the first-stage capital k, and
that the depreciation charges of the second-stage capital investment K are fully
reinvested. This distinction also highlights the heterogeneity of capital over
the lice-cycle of the enterprise. In the second production stage, the successful
enterprise accumulates net assets, ∆V = F (K) +K − k. It can be sold or the
firm can go public through an IPO with its shares traded on the stock market,
allowing the entrepreneur to exit.8 The time line of our three-stage model is
presented in Figure 1.
Assume separable linear utility (risk-neutrality) of an entrepreneur and let
V denote the value of an entrepreneurial career in risky industries. The cash
flows in periods 1 and 2 for a risky career are
d = af(e, k) + k −K; D = F (K) +K. (1)
Let r = the interest rate. Only the first-stage cash flow d is subject to uncer-
tainty. After the first stage, the entrepreneur obtains a signal of the project’s
success. The second-stage cash flow D, at the liquidation of the project, is
conditional on success in the initial period but it is deterministic. In terms of
7Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify private benefits as a source of agency costs between
owner-managers and external shareholders. Once shares in a firm are sold to outsiders, the
entrepreneur has an incentive to exploit the resourses of the firm for his consumption, reducing
his labor input because he has to share with the outsiders the profit he makes. However, the
value of the enterprise is adjusted for the agency cost. In our model, there is no such conflict
of interest. However, our model allows for non-taxed private benefits because surviving entre-
preneurs when investing in legitimate business expenses, for example, have access to private
consumption using the resources of the enterprise. Equally relevant, the founding entrepre-
neur gets personal satisfaction from working in his own firm. Parker (2004) reviews studies
on income diﬀerences between entrepreneurs and workers. Comparisons are problematic for
several reasons. For example, unsuccessful entrepreneurs are not shown in statistics.
8 In standard models, the technology is taken to be invariant to the corporate culture and
learning in the internal organization of production. This is diﬀrent in our model.
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Figure 1: Time line of the model
backward induction, the project value at the beginning of the second stage is
V1(b) = −K +
D + bK
1 + r
(2)
Then, provided the occupational choice satisfies the participation constraint,
the optimal risky career satisfies
Vo(a) = max
e,k
µ
− (c(e) + k) + π 1
1 + r
[af(e, k) + k + V ∗1 (b)]
¶
, (3)
where V ∗1 (b) = maxK V1(b) . Note that Vo(a) should be read as the life-time
value of the entrepreneurial occupation of an individual with entrepreneurial
ability a and given that he invests optimally in both stages of his life-cycle.
It becomes important to analyze separately the costs of capital for the first
stage and the second stage. The optimal expansion investment of surviving
enterprises satisfies
FK(K) = r − b. (4)
This expression represents the second-stage cost of capital. Private benefits re-
duce it as they operate as perfect substitutes for cash dividends.9 Note, however,
that this eﬀect is relevant only for successful enterprises.
The cost of capital for the start-up investment is
fk(e, k) = (
1
a
)
∙
1− π
π
+
r
π
¸
, (5)
The cost of capital is the skill-scaled cost of depreciation multiplied by the
odds of failure, (1− π) /π, and the risk-adjusted interest lost, r/π. High failure
risk (low π) discourages the initial investment. There are two reasons why the
initial cost of capital is greater than the expansion-stage cost of capital,
9For tax analysis, their role is important as they are unobservable and represent an untaxed
source of entrepreneurial income.
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Lemma 1 The initial-stage cost of capital is greater than the expansion-stage
cost of capital when risks are greater in the early stages of an enterprise and be-
cause surviving enterprises provide private benefits for entrepreneurs. Moreover,
less able entrepreneurs have a higher cost of capital.
Moreover, note that when the two conditions (4) and (5) hold with equality,
they describe an interior solution for the optimal dividend along the growth
path. When optimal be, bk and bK are determined, the optimal dividend is ob-
tained from bd = af(e,bk) − bK. This can be contrasted with the model by Sinn
(1991a) where the firm pays no dividend along the expansion path. We can also
have a corner solution with all cash flow invested and no dividends paid out if the
second-stage investment is expected to be highly profitable with FK( bK) > r−b.
Excluding the possibility of a negative dividend (share issue), the cost of capital
does not determine the amount invested. Thus, along the growth path, there
is an optimal dividend policy, bd ≥ 0. With regard to the dividend decision, our
model deviates from Sinn (1991a), whose firm has the same investment oppor-
tunities over time. In our model, the second investment opportunity arises only
after the first investment opportunity has been tested.
Large private benefits, when related to enterprise size, reduce cash dividends
in the early stage and raise investment. With c(e) = 12e
2, the first-order condi-
tion for eﬀort satisfies
fe(e, k) = (
1
a
)
∙
1
π
+
r
π
¸
e. (6)
The left-hand side represents the marginal return on eﬀort. The right-hand
side is the product of the initial cost of capital and the marginal cost of eﬀort,
i.e. its full opportunity cost. A high first-stage cost of capital reduces the
entrepreneurial eﬀort.
We now characterize another key decision of the entrepreneur, i.e. entry, the
career choice.
Career choice Market entry is endogenous and the entry threshold can be
stated in terms of the marginal entrepreneurial ability, a. Entrepreneurs com-
pare various candidate projects using the discount rate, r, introduced above,
to provide a ranking. Those who enter as entrepreneurs evaluate the expected
value of their career, Vo(a), and compare it to the life-time value of an outside
option, w. This can be viewed as secured labor income (insured by social insur-
ance). Then, the entry threshold, which depends on the quality of a candidate
as an entrepreneur, is given by the condition
Vo(a) ≥ w. (7)
Proposition 2 The value of an entrepreneurial career is monotonically increas-
ing in the ability a.
Proof. Consider an individual with marginally higher entrepreneurial ability
than an individual with ability a, i.e. having a + da. Then, his initial cost of
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capital in (5) is lower; similarly his private cost of eﬀort is lower. Consequently,
he provides more eﬀort and invests more in the start-up stage. However, because
of the envelope theorem, these eﬀects cancel out in the value of an entrepreneurial
career. The direct eﬀect is given by ∂Vo(a)/∂a = π1+rf(be,bk) which is positive.
The most able agents thus become entrepreneurs and they have a lower cost
of capital, given that the outside option is unrelated to entrepreneurial skill. For
the marginal entrepreneur with ability am, V (am) = w holds. This completes
our framework.
3 Classical tax system
Tax authorities face a particularly hard task in designing a tax structure for en-
trepreneurs. They obviously want to avoid distorting enterprise formation and
its quality and subsequent capital investment. They might want high-ability
types to become entrepreneurs. They want to balance between the taxation of
early returns in the form of corporation tax and dividend tax and later returns,
say capital gains from an IPO, when the entrepreneur quits his project. Fi-
nally, they want to avoid penalizing eﬀort, whilst recognizing that part of the
subsequent gains arise in terms of unobservable private benefits.
Incorporated enterprise Tax treatment diﬀers in the case of an incorpo-
rated company compared to a sole proprietor. We consider first the case of an
incorporated company. Taxes from enterprises are collected at the firm level
and the entrepreneur level. Let τ c, τd, τg, τw denote the tax rates on profits,
dividends, capital gains and earned income.10 Tax on interest income is not
explicitly introduced.
We first develop the expression for tax liability. As the eﬀort cost is private
information, the profits tax base in the first stage of a successful firm is af(e, k),
while under the classical system the dividend tax base is d = (1−τ c)af(e, k)+k−
K. The second-stage profits tax falls on F (K). The capital gains tax liability of
the expansion stage is based on the after-corporation-tax cash flow (1−τ c)F (K),
adjusted for the diﬀerence in the terminal and initial asset values. The second-
stage return is assumed to be collected as a capital gain.
Consider a case where the surviving enterprise is acquired by another firm.
What is the market value of an enterprise whose ownership is sold through an
IPO? The widely adopted principle of aﬃliation privilege indicates that mergers
can be motivated by tax considerations (Sinn (1987), King (1989)). The trapped
equity view suggests that it is cheaper to expand by purchasing companies than
by buying new capital goods. This is the undervaluation result. The rate of
undervaluation is given by 1−τd1−τg .
11
10We consider enterprises with a domestic owner. Hence, the mechanisms of an open econ-
omy in the form of foreign ownership do not arise.
11The relevant undervaluation for the creation of incorporated companies is caused by the
extra taxes levied on the corporate form, as explained by King (1989), cf. above.
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This view suggests that it is the ultimate owner’s taxation which dictated
the valuation of the acquired firm. However, one can also suggest that in cases
where firms bid for other firms, their reservation price is greater. Let Vr = the
amount a firm is willing to pay for another firm as an alternative to paying a
cash dividend to its owners.
The opportunity cost of each euro of such funds to the owners is 1 − τd.
Therefore, the after-tax value of such funds is, (1− τd)Vr. When the retained
profit is used instead to acquire another firm, producing output F (K) in the
mature stage, its value net of taxes to the owners of the acquiring firm is
(1− τd) [(1 − τ c)F (K) +K]. The equality of the two expressions provides the
reservation value of the acquired company
Vr = (1− τ c)F (K) +K.
Therefore, undervaluation disappears.
The initial investment k qualifies as an expense in the capital gains taxation
at the end of the planning horizon. The taxable capital gain in the end is thus12
∆Vg = (1− τ c)F (K) +K − k.
However, if the firm is undervalued in the IPO, the founding entrepreneur ob-
tains less than Vr = (1 − τ c)F (K) +K by the amount −(1 − γ)Vr where the
parameter 1−τd1−τg ≤ γ denotes the rate of undervaluation in the light of the two
views.13 In classical corporation tax with full expensing of the depreciated first-
stage capital k, the tax liability of a successful incorporated enterprise in a risky
industry is thus
T (e, k,K) = τ c
af(e, k)
1 + r
+ τd
(1− τ c)af(e, k) + k −K
1 + r
+τ c
F (K)
(1 + r)2
+ τg
γ [F (K)(1− τ c) +K]− k
(1 + r)2
(8)
+(1− γ)(1− τ c)F (K) +K
(1 + r)2
,
the last term represents the undervaluation caused by the tax system to the
owners of the firm to be sold.
Sole proprietor In the case of a sole proprietor, the profits tax is equal to
τw and there is no separate dividend tax. Moreover, the accumulated retained
12Note that in our model, ∆Vg > 0. Government would not share a potential capital loss
with an entrepreneur.
13We notice that the upper limit of γ need not be restricted to being less than 1. For
example, the tax system to be introduced in Finland implies that γ > 1 for domestically
controlled companies.
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earnings do not generate taxable income when the business is sold.14 The tax
liability then reads
T (e, k,K) = τw
af(e, k)
1 + r
+ τw
F (K)
(1 + r)2
. (9)
Thus, an incorporated company subject to a proportional dividend and capital
gains tax is taxed more heavily than a sole proprietor, unless the progressive
taxation of earnings of the latter makes a diﬀerence.15
In the case of a sole proprietor, the first-order conditions of the entrepreneur’s
optimization problem reduce to the following conditions for the second- and
first-stage cost of capital and for the supply of eﬀort:
FK(K) =
r − b
1− τw
(10)
afk(e, k) =
(1− π)/π + r/π
1− τw
(11)
afe(e, k) =
∙
1/π + r/π
1− τw
¸
e, (12)
which, as a matter of fact, are the benchmark values of a Johansson-Samuelson
tax, taxing all income comprehensively once, including interest income. The tax
is neutral with respect to the project choice.16
The decision to incorporate Assuming identical cash flows from incorpo-
rated and unincorporated businesses, King (1977, ch. 4) concludes that under
classical double taxation of dividends, an entrepreneur would never incorporate
his business if dividends are the sole form of profit distribution, but he incor-
porates his business if the double-tax rate of retained earnings is less than the
personal tax rate, i.e. if (1− τ c)(1− τg) > (1− τw) holds true. Contrasting (8)
with (9), we see that the rate of corporation tax τ c acts in (8) similarly as τw
aﬀects (9). Hence, either τ c must be considerably less than τw or the cash flows
af(e, k) and F (K) of an incorporated company must accordingly be higher to
cover the additional three terms in (8) for the incorporation to take place.
14We assume no goodwill gains at the instant of realization, which is equivalent to assuming
that the subsequent future cash flows satisfy the rate of return requirement but do not create
additional value.
15There are, however, other potential advantages, for example limited liability for firms
which operate as incorporated companies and better liquidity of their share certificates even
in the case of a non-listed company.
16Under such an income tax with economic depreciation, the tax-rate-invariant valuation of
investment projects holds (cf. Sinn 1987, King 1977, 117), though the intertemporal distortion
of saving and investment decisions remains.
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3.1 Career choice: entrepreneurship or labor market?
When incorporated, the entrepreneur maximizes
V τ = max
e,k,K
[Vo(eτ , kτ ,Kτ )− πT (eτ , kτ ,Kτ )],
where the notation with the super index τ denotes the variables under taxation.
Consider first the entrepreneurial choices under a uniform structure of tax rates,
τ c = τd = τg = τw. For a choice between the outside option and a sole proprietor
(an unincorporated enterprise), the tax structure is neutral, but it need not be
neutral in respect of the formation of incorporated companies. In the classical
tax system, owing to the double taxation of corporate income, the after-tax
enterprise value is lower than the present value of the after-tax outside option
with identical cash flows. Though this mechanism is implicitly discussed in
the tax literature (Harberger (1962)), it largely abstracts from the question of
occupational choice. We therefore report it as a proposition.
Proposition 3 Let aτ denote the marginal entrepreneurial talent under tax-
ation. Then it follows that under a tax structure with uniform tax rates, i.e.
τ = τ c = τd = τg = τw, there is a positive relationship between the tax rate and
the marginal talent, ∂aτ/∂τ > 0.
Proof. We prove the result formally in the case where the tax structure is
constructed in an ingenious way in that it is neutral in respect of eﬀort choice
eτ and investments kτ ,Kτ . Consider the indiﬀerence condition for occupational
choice under taxation,
V τo (a
τ ) = w(1− τw),
or
− (c(eτ ) + kτ ) + π 1
1 + r
[aτf(eτ , kτ ) + kτ + V ∗τ1 (b)]
−π[τ c
aτf(eτ , kτ )
1 + r
+ τd
(1− τ c)aτf(eτ , kτ )−Kτ
1 + r
+τ c
F (Kτ )
(1 + r)2
+ τg
(γF (Kτ )(1− τ c) +Kτ )− kτ
(1 + r)2
+(1− γ)(1− τ c)F (K
τ ) +Kτ
(1 + r)2
]− w(1− τw) = 0.
We consider the case γ = 1. Introducing τ = τ c = τd = τg = τw and deviding
throughout by (1− τ), then diﬀerentiating this condition (which is an identity)
in respect of the tax rate τ and ability aτ , gives
daτ
dτ
=
aτf(eτ , kτ ) + 11+rF (K
τ ) + (1+r)(c(e
τ )+kτ )
π(1−τ)2 −
bKτ+(2+r)kτ
(1+r)(1−τ)2
(1− τ)f(eτ , kτ ) .
We can take it for granted that the three positive terms dominate the last one.17
17 It is fairly obvious that the diﬀerence of the third and fourth terms is positive.
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The above proof holds strictly for a tax structure which does not distort the
eﬀort choice eτ and investments kτ ,Kτ . However, we expect it to hold more
generally. We therefore prove
Proposition 4 Let am and aτ denote the marginal entrepreneurial talents in
the absence of taxation and under taxation, respectively. Then it follows that
under a tax structure with uniform tax rates, i.e. τ c = τd = τg = τw, there is
a linear dependence between the marginal entrepreneurial talents
aτ = βo + β1a
m,
where β1 is a strictly positive constant and greater than one.
Proof. In the absence of taxation, the marginal entrepreneur am is identified
from the condition
− (c(e) + k) + π 1
1 + r
[amf(e, k) + k + V ∗1 (b)] = w.
Inserting into the indiﬀerence condition under taxation, and recalling that V ∗1 (b) =
−K + F (K)+(1+b)K1+r , we find that there is a linear dependence between the mar-
ginal abilities
aτ = βo + β1a
m.
Its parameters are given by
β1 =
(1− τw)
(1− τ c)(1− τd)
f(e, k)
f(eτ , kτ )
.
and by
βo =
1
π
1+r (1− τ c)(1− τd)f(eτ , kτ )
Z
where
Z = (c(eτ ) + kτ )− (1− τw)(c(e) + k)
+π
1
1 + r
[(1− τw)V ∗1 (b)− V ∗τ1 (b)]
+π
1
1 + r
[(1− τw)(k − (1 + τg)kτ )]
+π[τd
−Kτ
1 + r
+ τ c
F (Kτ )
(1 + r)2
+τg
(γF (Kτ )(1− τ c) +Kτ )
(1 + r)2
+ (1− γ) (1− τ c)F (K
τ ) +Kτ
(1 + r)2
]
We know that under distortive taxes, eτ < e, kτ < k, and that Kτ < K. Thus,
f(e,k)
f(eτ ,kτ ) > 1. With a uniform tax rate,
(1−τw)
(1−τc)(1−τd) > 1. Therefore, β1 >> 1.
Moreover, the greater the dividend and the corporate tax rates, the greater the
coeﬃcient β1. This tends to make a
τ > am. Inspection of Z leads us to conclude
12
that though there are both positive and negative terms in βo, there is no reason
to doubt that there is positive dependence between aτ and am as β1 >> 1.
18
What our proposition suggests is that even a uniform tax structure τ c =
τd = τg = τw is distortive in respect of enterprise formation. With identical
cash flows, the after-tax enterprise value would be lower in the classical tax
system than the present value of the after-tax outside option. The dividend tax
is distortionary and aﬀects the career choice of individuals between entrepre-
neurship and entering the labor force. The non-neutrality of dividend taxation
follows from the observation that double taxation of profits reduces the ex ante
value of the yet unborn enterprise relative to the after-tax value of the outside
option. For the equality V τo (a
m) = w(1−τw) to hold, am must be greater with a
uniform tax structure than in the absence of taxation, that is, the new business
idea must show greater profitability, cf. King (1989).
With a non-uniform tax structure, an additional distortion is created by the
undervaluation at exits. Dividend taxation may thus have larger distortions
on enterprise formation than has been previously recognized by the literature
emphasizing its capitalization. This mechanism is seldom analyzed in the liter-
ature discussing the neutrality of dividend taxation in respect of expansion in-
vestments by mature companies, in particular. The exceptions are King (1989),
Keuschnigg (2001) and Dietz (2003).
3.2 Capital costs
Second-stage cost of capital Consider the investment incentives of incor-
porated companies. With taxation, the second-stage cost-of-capital transforms
into
FK(K) =
r − b
(1− τg)(1− τ c)γ
+
1− γ
(1− τg)(1− τ c)γ
− τd(1 + r)− τgγ
(1− τg)(1− τ c)γ
(13)
The second term, in eﬀect a capital loss, captures the undervaluation caused
by taxation in the market value of an enterprise, when sold to the next owner.
We indeed find that the expansion investment is subject to the standard double
taxation eﬀect, (1−τg)(1−τ c). Moreover, the expansion investment is sensitive
to the relative magnitude of tax rates on dividends and capital gains. To the
extent that the enterprise provides untaxed private benefits, these tax eﬀects
are mitigated. The dividend tax can be avoided by additional investment. The
dividend tax rate is the fraction at which the tax authority participates in
the investment expenditure and the eﬀective capital gains tax rate τgγ is the
authority’s share of the future returns of the venture. Hence, the entrepreneur
cannot avoid taxation of business income forever. The postponed dividends will
ultimately be subject to a capital gains tax (cf. Sinn (1987), 94-95).
The perfect undervaluation of the "new view", i.e. with γ = 1−τd1−τg plugged
18Note that βo ≥ 0 is not even needed for aτ > am.
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into (13), results in
FK(K) =
r − b
(1− τ c)
. (14)
That is, the eﬀect of both the dividend tax and the capital gains tax on
the cost of capital cancels out in (13). This means that only the corporation
tax distorts. Because r is the post-tax rate of interest, the result corresponds
to the Johansson-Samuelson tax if the tax rate on interest income equals the
corporation tax rate. Also, if τw = τ c holds, the corporation tax does not
distort the expansion of incorporated enterprises in the Harberger sense, as can
be seen from (10) and (14).
Recall the trapped equity view. In our model, dividend tax can be avoided
by investing and taking the deferral gain. The celebrated trapped equity model
suggests that the dividend tax is neutral in respect of long-run capital because
it is paid anyway, whether profit is distributed or invested. Our model produces
the same result in (14). But, with a positive capital gains tax rate, the cost of
capital (14) is lower than the standard new view with FK(K) = r−b(1−τg)(1−τc)
suggests. Therefore, capital gains tax provides a boost to expansion investment.
The reason is that in our model realization-based capital gains tax does not
increase the owner’s rate of discount.
If there is no undervaluation, the results change dramatically. With γ = 1
in (13), it is the dividend tax which clearly provides a boost to the expansion
investment. This result is just the opposite to the old view, because in our
model the marginal source of finance is profits.
First-stage cost of capital Consider next the early investment. The first-
order condition in respect of the initial investment k is given by
afk(e, k) =
µ
1
π
¶
1− π + r
(1− τd)(1− τ c)
−
µ
1
1 + r
¶
τg
(1− τd)(1− τ c)
. (15)
The dividend tax negatively aﬀects the start-up investment. In the classical
tax system, the double tax enters the first-period cost of capital, crossing up
not only the post-tax rate of interest, r/π, as in the Harberger-Sinn model, but
also the cost of capital asset (= (1−π)/π), the owner’s initial equity stake. This
is because the first-stage enterprise is not a going concern, capital k having a
zero scrap value. But, undervaluation of equity does not increase the first-stage
cost of capital (15) as Sinn (1991a,b) implicates.19 By contrast, we find that
realization-based capital gains tax alleviates the double taxation of the initial
investment. Because of this, the firm has an incentive to invest more heavily
in the beginning. Dietz (2003) identifies a similar eﬀect. It arises from the fact
19Sinn (1991a,1991b) states that the capital loss caused by dividend taxation drives the
shadow value of capital below its replacement value q = 1, indicating a higher cost of capital
and higher distortion than in the Harberger case. In a sense the argument is based on a kind
of fallacy. Though the shadow price of real capital decreases along the firms’s growth path,
the market value of the whole firm continuously increases at the owner’s rate of discount.
Ylä-Liedenpohja (1978) is more explicit on this account.
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that the initial investment will be expensed against the owner’s capital gains
liability in the second period. Therefore, the owner’s eﬀective purchase cost of
the initial capital asset is 1 − τg/(1 + r) of a euro. This is in contrast to the
standard new view approach in which the role of accrual-based capital gains tax
is to raise the cost of capital via raising the rate of discount, while in our model
its role is closer to that of a cash flow tax.
Proposition 5 The first-stage cost of capital is raised by the dividend tax (Sinn
(1991a)). The second-stage capital gains tax acts as a balancing force on the
first-stage cost of capital.
These results reflect the mechanism whereby dividend tax and capital gains
tax represent alternative ways of taxing enterprises. The intertemporal eﬀects
of dividend tax and capital gains tax deserve some attention. We find that
the opportunity cost of investing in expansion investment K financed from the
profits of the first stage is reduced by the dividend tax, as the owner can reduce
his dividend tax liability in the first period by investing for the second phase.
Capital gains tax on successful firms, however, raises the investment threshold
in the second-period by raising the cost of capital of the expansion investment.
These eﬀects, however, balance each other perfectly, if there is perfect underval-
uation in the sense of the new view at the end of the second period and neither
the dividend tax nor the capital gains tax has any eﬀect on the cost of capital
(14).
From another angle, a dividend tax tilts the investment program, reducing
the early stage investment and market entry, but strengthens the expansion
investment, if the old view of its eﬀect on the share value γ = 1 holds true.
The Sinn-Harberger model obtains a similar time path. The diﬀerence here is
that in our model the firm pays dividends on the path, while in Sinn-Harberger
model, dividends are paid in the terminal state only.
Assume τw = τ c to facilitate comparison of (15) and (11). We find that
the first-stage cost of capital is in fact higher than that for an unincorporated
company (11) if
1− τg
(1 + r)2
> 1− τd
holds true. Then, with a uniform tax structure τg = τd, but with a realization-
based capital gains tax, the Harberger distortion against the initial size of in-
corporated enterprises holds true. Only in the opposite case
τd <
τg
(1 + r)2
,
which incidentally is eﬀectively achieved under an imputation system for divi-
dends but not for retained earnings, there is no Harberger distortion, but such
a system provides a boost to the initial size of incorporated enterprises.
Because unobservable eﬀort cannot qualify for a tax shield, both corporation
tax and dividend tax reduce the optimal eﬀort. This can be seen from the tax-
15
adjusted first-order condition for eﬀort
fe(e, k) =
µ
(1− π) + r
aπ
¶
e
(1− τd)(1− τ c)
. (16)
and contrasting it with (12).
4 Conclusions
The paper studies the eﬀect of a classical corporation tax system, with an
investor-level dividend and capital gains taxes, on enterprise formation and on
the entrepreneur’s investment incentives in a three-stage model. At stage t = 0,
the individual makes his career choice as to whether to take the outside option
or to enter a risky entrepreneurial career. We find his career choice is aﬀected
by the tax system. The higher the additional tax burden levied on the corporate
form, the higher the ability threshold of individuals who choose entrepreneur-
ship. The potential undervaluation of the company at the entrepreneur’s exit
stage additionally increases his entry threshold.
Having chosen his career, the entrepreneur invests for the first stage, financ-
ing it with his own funds, and chooses his eﬀort. The standard double-tax eﬀects
of dividend taxation arise both for the eﬀort and initial-stage investment,20 but
the latter discouragement is compensated by the realization-based capital gains
tax in the later stage. In fact, we demonstrate that a tax system where the
investor-level dividend tax is lower than the present value of the capital gains
tax boosts the initial size of incorporated enterprises. Such a tax condition is
easily obtained under imputation credits on dividends. Undervaluation does
not aﬀect the first-stage investment as often suggested. The second-stage in-
vestment is assumed to be financed from the first-stage profits as in the new
view model. We show that with undervaluation, the expansion-stage cost of
capital corresponds to the Johansson-Samuelson tax and it is therefore lower
than the standard new view suggests, but that without undervaluation, the div-
idend tax provides a boost to investment in the expansion stage. Because of
the time path of uncertainty, the initial-stage cost of capital is higher than the
expansion-stage cost. Also, less able individuals have a higher initial-stage cost
of capital.
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